

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

29 June 1963

Copy No. C *ED-2*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

25X1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES,

TOP SECRET

227743

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/07/23 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100140001-7

Approved For Release 2002/07/23 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100140001-7

25X1

29 June 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Communist Bloc: East European party chiefs gathering in East Berlin. (Page 1)
2. USSR - Communist China - Belgium: Pro-Chinese faction is fighting for control of Belgian Communist party. (Page 2)
3. South Vietnam: Buddhist leaders are thinking increasingly in terms of political action. (Page 3)
4. Indonesia: Sukarno moves to curb Communist labor union agitation. (Page 4)
5. Brazil: Government appears to be supporting Communist-backed student seminar. (Page 5)
6. British Guiana: Prospects improve for settlement of general strike. (Page 6)
7. USSR: Khrushchev warns that ideological deviation can result in expulsion from the party. (Page 7)
8. Notes: Czechoslovakia; North Korea - South Korea; Iran; Italy (Page 8)

25X1

25X1

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 June 1963

DAILY BRIEF

*Communist Bloc: East European party chiefs are gathering in East Berlin.

Except for Rumania's Gheorghiu-Dej, Khrushchev and party heads from all of Moscow's East European allies are in East Berlin or have announced their intention to go there for Ulbricht's seventieth birthday celebration on Sunday. The occasion provides Khrushchev an opportunity to coordinate strategy with the satellite leaders for the Sino-Soviet talks as well as to counteract any unsettling effects in East Germany and elsewhere in Eastern Europe from the President's trip. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

USSR - Communist China - Belgium: The Chinese Communists have scored an important tactical victory in their campaign to develop pro-Peiping factions in Soviet-led foreign Communist parties.

Pro-Chinese rebels have split the Belgian Communist Party into warring camps and are fighting to seize control. Led by former central committee member Jacques Grippa, expelled from the party in April by pro-Soviet leaders, the new "Brussels Federation" held a "special congress" on 23 June, "dissolved" the existing Soviet-controlled organization, replaced it with a pro-Chinese group, and demanded a special party national congress.

25X1

(Peiping has been supplying its Belgian sympathizers with funds and has been pumping pro-Chinese polemical materials into Belgian party channels. Last April, the Chinese ordered increased efforts within Western Communist parties. The Belgian party is the first in Western Europe to split, another indication that Peiping's appeal transcends geographic and racial considerations.)

Grippa has rallied considerable support within the Belgian party but it appears unlikely that his faction will succeed in taking over at this time. It may later form a significant splinter party, however, which would serve Peiping as a useful tool.

The timing of the split is probably calculated to reinforce Peiping's position in the coming struggle with the Russians at Moscow. The Chinese campaign to establish splinter parties wherever possible may have the longer-range goal of laying the foundations for the formation of a new International led by Peiping.

25X1


29 June 63

DAILY BRIEF

2

25X1

South Vietnam: (Some Buddhist leaders apparently are thinking increasingly in terms of political action, possibly including support for an attempt to overthrow the Diem government.)



25X1

25X1

(The term set by the Buddhists for the government to give evidence of its intention to honor the 16 June agreement to end religious differences expires on 30 June. Buddhists in Saigon and Hué plan new demonstrations this week end.)

25X1

(The Communists are seeking to add to the tensions prevailing in the capital. Viet Cong terrorists were apparently responsible for the bomb explosions on 28 June in the US MAAG compound there.)

25X1

29 June 63

DAILY BRIEF

3

25X1

25X1

Indonesia: Sukarno has moved to curb Communist labor union agitation which would obstruct his new economic program.

Early this month the Communist Party and SOBSI, the large Communist-controlled labor federation, began work slowdowns among transport and dockworkers. Strikes in these and other enterprises were reported to be under consideration. The Communists apparently wanted to test the authorities' reactions as well as to exploit the workers' economic grievances. The Communist Party is now controlled by its militant, pro-Chinese wing.

Sukarno, who returned to the country on 27 June, is said to have viewed these activities as an attempt to sabotage the economic stabilization plan which the government is developing with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] the Communist unions' activities would lead them into a conflict with the anti-Communist army, the other major political force in Indonesia. Sukarno has consistently sought to avoid such a development.

To warn the Communists that they were going too far, he has issued a regulation banning strikes in "vital enterprises," and placing enforcement of the ban in the army's hands. While the regulation applies to all unions, only the Communist-controlled ones have the capability of using strikes effectively, and the regulation thus in practice is directed only at them.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Brazil: (The Goulart regime appears to be giving support to a Communist-backed international student seminar.)

(The meeting is scheduled for 7-14 July in Salvador de Bahia under sponsorship of the leftist Brazilian National Union of Students (UNE) and the Communist-dominated International Union of Students.)

25X1

25X1

(The Communist Chinese are reportedly sending 14 delegates. The dominant ideology of the UNE leadership is said to be nearer the Chinese militant revolutionary line than the Moscow line.)

25X1

25X1

29 June 63

DAILY BRIEF

5

25X1

25X1

*British Guiana: (Prospects are apparently improving for a settlement of the 71-day-old general strike under circumstances which would leave the Jagan government substantially intact, if not in a stronger position.)

25X1

(In response to an invitation from the British Guiana Trades Union Council, the British TUC is sending one of its top executives to the colony this week end to attempt to arrange a return to work. Some of the strikers want to return to work, but the union leadership insists on having an assurance that arrears of pay will be made up, and that the government's controversial labor relations bill will be permanently shelved. These assurances Premier Jagan has so far refused to give.)

(The UN Decolonization Committee agreed on 27 June to set up an investigating subcommittee. The British are opposing the idea of the subcommittee's visiting the colony, although both Jagan and Burnham would be in favor. The committee probably favors Jagan.)

25X1

25X1

25X1

29 June 63

DAILY BRIEF

6

25X1

*USSR: Khrushchev has revealed that ideological indiscipline exists in the Soviet party and has warned that deviation from the Kremlin line could result in loss of party membership.

In a hitherto unpublished speech to the Central Committee plenum on 21 June, Khrushchev declared that supporting the "peaceful coexistence" of Western and Communist ideology is a betrayal of communism. Advocates of such views he branded as "agents of bourgeois imperialism." He chastized certain persons--whom he refused to name--for signing a letter on ideological coexistence and suggested that the party quickly rid itself of all who advocate such deviation.

Addressing himself to recalcitrant Soviet intellectuals, Khrushchev made it clear that describing only the negative features of Soviet life is tantamount to serving bourgeois ideological aims. He stated that the party will suppress those literary and artistic works it finds unacceptable.

Khrushchev revealed his personal sensitivity to charges of complicity in the crimes of Stalin--an underlying theme in the regime's polemic with its liberally oriented intelligentsia--and implied that he had carried the day against certain members of the Presidium who opposed his revelation of Stalin's crimes at the 20th Party Congress in 1956.

Khrushchev's speech provided no new insights on the Sino-Soviet dispute or on developments in Soviet foreign policy.

25X1

25X1

29 June 63

DAILY BRIEF

7

NOTES

Czechoslovakia: Both the Czech and the Slovak press have generally ignored Novotny's 12 June hard-line speech reversing the decision that certain Slovak victims of the 1950-54 purges would be fully rehabilitated. A similar hard-line speech by Slovak party first secretary Dubcek on 26 June indicated the regime's continued concern over Slovak dissidence and the undiminished demands for speedy de-Stalinization. Novotny will probably have to use stronger measures against critics of his regime within the party if he wishes to restore discipline.

25X1

25X1

North Korea - South Korea: Pyongyang's offer of rice to relieve the South Korean food crisis, with accompanying propaganda, is similar to earlier North Korean efforts to exploit economic difficulties in the South. These North Korean gestures have been designed--without much success--to attract popular attention and bring widespread demands that the Seoul government abandon its stand against direct dealings with North Korea.

25X1

25X1

Iran: Antigovernment agitation is again increasing in Tehran. Clandestinely distributed leaflets attacking the Shah are more numerous and more bitter, and dissident religious leaders are reported to be organizing new demonstrations for 12 July and subsequent dates. Security forces are alert to this possibility, and can be expected to act more quickly to forestall or put down further demonstrations than they did in early June.

25X1

25X1

25X1

29 June 63

DAILY BRIEF

8

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/07/23 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100140001-7


Approved For Release 2002/07/23 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100140001-7

25X1

***Italy:** The Socialists (PSI) indirectly supported the Leone government this week by abstaining in parliamentary voting on budget matters, which may mean that they will support Leone when he seeks a full-fledged vote of confidence early next month. A final decision is to be taken at a meeting of the party leadership now scheduled for 2 July. Socialist support or acquiescence is virtually essential to Leone's survival because the backing of the Republicans and Social Democrats will probably depend on what the PSI does.

25X1

25X1



29 June 63

DAILY BRIEF

9

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/07/23 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100140001-7

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/07/23 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100140001-7

TOP SECRET